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Abstract
Fiscal decentralization is widely proposed as an efficient means
to accommodate ethnic violence. Yet while most of the econo-
metric cross-country studies supports this view, case studies offer
mixed results. In this paper, it is argued that this is partly due
to the fact that fiscal decentralization exerts a heterogeneous im-
pact across ethnic local majorities and minorities, both types of
groups being regionally concentrated. The main argument in
favour of fiscal decentralization is that by politically and fiscally
empowering the local communities, these are enabled to allocate
public spending in a way that is closer to their preferences. This
paper hypothesises that such an empowerment mechanism, while
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relevant for local majorities, is likely to perform poorly for local
minorities as they are not in a dominant position locally. This
might feed ethnic violence as local minorities mobilize to obtain
administrative regions in which they would control the decen-
tralized policy. Similarly, fiscal decentralization could fuel com-
munal violence as politically marginalized ethnic minorities clash
against powerful local majorities. The article also hypothesises
that the concern expressed by sceptics that fiscal decentraliza-
tion undermines national cohesion and encourages secessionism
is more acute for local majorities than for local minorities as the
latter are usually too small to credibly envisage independence.
Such hypotheses are discussed in the paper and then empirically
tested on a panel dataset of ethnic local majorities and minori-
ties across the world on the period 1985-2001. The main results
are that i) fiscal decentralization does not encourage secessionism
but on the contrary dampen rebellion of local majorities but, ii)
fiscal decentralization fuels rebellion of local minorities, iii) fiscal
decentralization reduces communal violence for both local ma-
jorities and minorities. As a result of its heterogeneous impact,
the article calls into question the relevance of relying on fiscal
decentralization to manage ethnic violence.
1 Introduction
Many economists consider that decentralization improves the quality of
governance, fosters political participation and helps designing and im-
plementing policies that are closer to the local preferences of the people.
In the field of development, the idea to resort to bottom-up approaches
- usually entailing a strong participatory dimension from people at the
grassroots - rather than to top-down approaches, is also gaining ground.
Political scientists and policy-makers tend also to call for decentraliza-
tion in order to dampen ethnic conflicts. As most conflicts around the
world are no more between states but within states, and as most of the
latter entail a significant ethnic dimension (Sambanis 2001), the ques-
2
tion of the desirability of decentralization for dealing with this issue is
a crucial one. Many developing countries have undertaken, or currently
undertake, a process of democratization of their institutions. This usu-
ally goes hand in hand with a higher level of fiscal decentralization (Bird
& Vaillancourt 1998). Many of these countries are also ethnically diverse
and plagued by ethnic conflicts of various degree of severity. Yet do we
know what are the consequences of the decentralization process on the
level and likelihood of ethnic conflict in a country? Moreover do we know
the distribution of the impact of decentralization across the various eth-
nic groups that compose a country? There exists several cross-country
estimations of the effectiveness of decentralization as a means to mitigate
ethnic conflict (Cohen 1997, Brancati 2006, Saideman, Lanoue, Camp-
enni & Stanton 2002, Bakke & Wibbels 2006, Tranchant 2008, Siegle &
O’Mahony 2006). They have usually found that decentralization was ef-
fective in managing ethnic violence conditional on certain country level
factors (absence of regional parties, economic development) and ethnic
group level factor (degree of spatial concentration). However, I claim
in this paper that one cannot derive fully reliable policy recommenda-
tions on the two aforementioned questions from the results of existing
large-N studies. That is because they fail to properly address the het-
erogeneous nature of the effect of decentralization across ethnic groups.
Indeed, most existing studies estimate the effect of decentralization av-
eraged over all ethnic groups in a country (Bakke & Wibbels 2006, Siegle
& O’Mahony 2006, Cohen 1997), which hides the potential presence of
within country variability. This yields misleading results if the average
effect of decentralization hides a great deal of heterogeneity. And results
in this paper suggest that this is the case. Decentralization does exert
a strong effect on ethnic violence but the sign of this effect points in
opposite direction with respect to groups’s demographic characteristics.
Depending upon the distribution of ethnic groups within a country and
depending upon the distribution of demographic characteristics of these
groups, the overall effect of decentralization can be null, negative or
positive.
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In this paper I draw on the study by Saideman et al. (2002) which has
contrasted the effect of federalism with respect to the degree of groups
spatial concentration. The study found that the intensity of rebellion
decreased with federalism, but this was true only for spatially concen-
trated groups. I undertake a similar approach for fiscal decentralization
and consider that beside groups spatial concentration, the local majority
status of groups is crucial to understand why some groups increase their
level of violence and why some others decrease it when decentralization
goes up. In a nutshell the rationale is as follows. The main merit as-
sociated with decentralization (fiscal or political) is that it brings the
government closer to the people. An ethnic group characterized by dif-
ferent preferences from the rest of the country will likely be marginalized
if the public policy is decided at the central level. Decentralized gov-
ernment, on the other hand, allows ethnic groups to partly control their
own affairs. But this requires that the ethnic groups are geographi-
cally concentrated but also, I argue, that they constitute a majority
in the administrative regions in which they reside. For concentrated
groups which are not local majorities, it is dubious that fiscal decentral-
ization will bring new opportunity to bear upon the political system.
On the contrary, one can fear that fiscal decentralization will encourage
these groups to fight against the local majority (communal violence)
or against the state (rebellion) in order to claim an autonomous status
(Cornell 2002).
One of the main result of the paper is to show that within the cate-
gory of concentrated groups (also referred to as ’territorial minorities’),
the effect of fiscal decentralization changes dramatically with respect to
the local majority status of the group. More specifically, the results
suggest that if fiscal decentralization is effective at managing rebellion
of local majorities, it also fuels rebellion for local minorities in the same
proportion. This suggests that in presence of fiscal decentralization, lo-
cal minorities fight for obtaining their own region in which they could
fully benefit from the decentralization. Countries find thus themselves in
a bind: refusing decentralization will foster rebellion from local majori-
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ties, and promoting fiscal decentralization will fuel rebellion from local
minorities. Thus, depending upon the number of each of these groups,
the overall effect of decentralization can be null, negative or positive.
Results for communal violence are more encouraging as I find that fiscal
decentralization is significantly associated with lower violence for every
groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
main arguments of the pros and cons of decentralization, and outlines
hypotheses about the relationships between fiscal decentralization, group
concentration, local majority and conflict behaviour. Section 3 presents
the empirical strategy and the data. Section 4 discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Fiscal Decentralization, Ethnic Conflict
and Demographic characteristics of Eth-
nic Groups
2.1 Does fiscal decentralization empower ethnic mi-
norities or unleash centrifugal forces?
Numerous scholars have called for decentralization as a means to man-
age ethnic conflict: (Lijphart 1977, Hechter 2000, Hooghe 2004, Lustick,
Miodownik & Eidelson 2004, Suberu 2001, Gurr 2000) for instance. The
main argument in favour of decentralization is that, in pluriethnic soci-
eties, decentralization allows ethnic minorities to control their own af-
fairs whilst the geographical integrity of the country is maintained. More
specifically, decentralization is aimed at managing "territorial cleavages",
that is, situations of conflict involving minorities which are geographi-
cally concentrated in some parts of the country. By bringing the govern-
ment closer to the people, decentralization allows the public policies to
reflect the local preferences (Oates 1972). If an ethnic group is character-
ized by preferences over the policy which are different from those of the
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dominant groups, decentralization results in an increase of its welfare.
Arguably, the increase in the group’s welfare is negatively associated
with its motive for rebellion.
In contrast, opponents point out that decentralization in multi-ethnic
countries contributes to ’freeze’ ethnic identities over time (Hardgrave
1993, Kymlicka 1998) and to reinforce the legitimacy of ethnically de-
fined subunits (Cornell 2002). Moreover, decentralization also provides
new institutional and economic resources to the separatist movements.
As a result decentralization fosters violent conflicts instead of preventing
them (Cornell 2002, Roeder 1991, Bunce 1999). This can be illustrated
by the experience of the Basque country in Spain where - despite a very
large degree of fiscal decentralization - the demands for independence
have not disappeared and terrorism activities are still ongoing. In addi-
tion, decentralization might further weaken the nation-building process.
The reason is that decentralization spurs centrifugal forces in a country
as each ethnic group claims its own administrative region in which it
would be dominant (Cornell 2002). The relationship between fiscal de-
centralization and creation of local administrative units has for a long
time remained overlooked by scholars. Green (2008a, 2008b) and Siegle
& O’Mahony (2006) report that in Uganda - one of the most ethnically
fragmented countries in the world - the fiscal decentralization process
has been accompanied by an enormous increase in the number of dis-
tricts. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that some local ethnic
minorities claimed their own districts. Another danger associated with
decentralization is that it may fuel communal violence at the local level
(Horowitz 1991, Nordlinger 1972, Suberu 1994).
The existing econometric studies tend to give credence to the propo-
nents of decentralization as decentralization is found to either decrease
rebellion and/or communal violence or to have no effect (Cohen 1997,
Saideman et al. 2002, Brancati 2006, Tranchant 2008). Only Siegle &
O’Mahony (2006) found that revenue decentralization was associated
with more rebellion. Bakke & Wibbels (2006) and Siegle & O’Mahony
(2006) have used country level measures of violence and therefore used
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every ethnic groups within a country to lead their estimations. The
econometric model of Cohen (1997) has pooled every ethnic groups to-
gether and does not distinguish between concentrated and dispersed
groups. Brancati (2006) and Tranchant (2008) have considered only
spatially concentrated groups as decentralization cannot empower dis-
persed groups. Previously, Saideman et al. (2002) have shown that fed-
eralism reduced rebellion only for concentrated groups. The upshot
is that the effect of decentralization has been estimated using either
all groups within a country or only the spatially concentrated groups.
Hence within the broad category of spatially concentrated groups the
effect of decentralization was assumed to be uniform.
I argue here that we need to go further and that fiscal decentral-
ization is likely to exert differentiated impacts on different types of
concentrated ethnic groups and that it is possible that decentraliza-
tion detracts some groups from violence whilst it fuels violence for some
others. Hence, the aim of this paper is to estimate the distributional
consequences of fiscal decentralization with respect to groups character-
istics. In the subsequent subsection I formulate hypotheses about the
relationship between fiscal decentralization, groups characteristics and
conflict behaviour. I chose to restrict the analysis to fiscal decentraliza-
tion as it is advised to many developing countries in order to improve
governance. Furthermore Siegle & O’Mahony (2006) argue that fiscal
decentralization is the strongest commitment to decentralization as it
involves that the central state gives away some of its powers.
2.2 Fiscal Decentralization, Local Majority status
and Ethnic Violence
It is useful first to define the term ethnic violence. In what follows I
consider two forms of ethnic violence, namely rebellion and communal
violence. Rebellion stands for violent anti-regime activities and commu-
nal violence refers to inter-groups violent rivalries. The two definitions
are those of the Minorities At Risk database whose data I use in the
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empirical section. Also, I refer in what follows to the region as a generic
name for the relevant local layer of government in which the minority
may or may not be concentrated. Depending on the countries, the term
region must be replaced by state, province or district or any other name
granted to local administrative units.
The main point of this paper is to claim that both arguments put
forward by proponents and opponents to decentralization alike need
to be restated in terms of the local minority/majority status of the
ethnic groups. I elaborate from the theoretical model of (Bjorvatn &
Cappelen 2003) which Let me consider first the argument over the em-
powerment of territorial minorities. In a democratic society, the decen-
tralized regional policy will be that of the regional median voter whilst
the centralized policy will follow the preference of the national median
voter (Bjorvatn & Cappelen 2003). It follows that fiscal decentraliza-
tion is desirable for ethnic groups which are too small to bear upon
national level politics and which are geographically concentrated. In
ethnofederations where administrative boundaries perfectly overlap eth-
nic groups boundaries, fiscal decentralization gives automatically new
opportunities for concentrated groups. Usually regions exhibit some de-
gree of ethnic diversity though it might be lower than at the national
level. In that case, for the mechanism of empowerment to work it is not
enough that a group is regionally concentrated, it must also account for
a simple local majority within the administrative region so that the re-
gional median voter will be for sure a member of the group (Bjorvatn &
Cappelen 2003). For a concentrated group that represents a local simple
majority, fiscal decentralization will increase the welfare and reduces the
motives for rebellion.
H1a: In a democratic society, fiscal decentralization reduces ethnic
violence for local majorities
It is important to note that in imperfect democracies or non-democracies,
the mechanism of the median voter does not fully apply. Either because
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some powerful interests distort the policy in their favour or because the
regional policy reflects the preferences of the central state or those of a
local minority which is better connected to the central state.
H1b: In imperfect or non democracies the effect of fiscal decentral-
ization on local majorities is ambiguous
If a group only accounts for a relative majority or is a local minor-
ity, the regional policy will not necessarily follow the preferences of the
group members. Therefore, the effect of fiscal decentralization will de-
pend on the regional and national distributions of preferences. Tenants
of decentralization tend to see the state as the main threat to ethnic
minorities. This implies that the gap in preferences of the considered
group and the state is higher than that between this same group any
other group in the country (Bjorvatn & Cappelen 2003). In that case,
a local minority will still benefit from fiscal decentralization as the gap
between its preferred policy and the implemented policy will always be
reduced with respect to centralization.
H2a: If the gap in preferences is wider between the state and the local
minority than it is between the local minority and any other group, then
decentralization reduces ethnic violence for local minorities
Ethnic conflicts do not only take place between the state and a mi-
nority. There are numerous evidences of inter-group clashes that do not
not involve the state directly. Local competition over resources or the
presence of an ethnicized economic organization drive groups to con-
flict all around the world. It is then conceivable that a local minority
might be worse-off in decentralization where it has to face a hostile local
majority than in centralization (Horowitz 1991, Suberu 1994). It is all
the more true if the checks and balances and democratic institutions
are weaker at the local level than at the country level (Bardhan 2002).
This can manifest itself through discriminatory policies enacted by the
regional majorities or a lack of political will to redress deep-rooted dis-
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criminatory social practices. The result might be an increase in the level
of communal violence.
H2b: Conversely, if the preferences of the local minority are more far
apart from those of the local majority than from those of the state, then
fiscal decentralization will result in communal violence
Now let me state the main arguments of the opponents of decen-
tralization in the perspective of the local majority/minority status of
the ethnic groups. The first concern is that decentralization reinforces
and legitimates the ethnic identities. Groups which are locally concen-
trated and form a local majority will benefit from a renewed legitimacy
and increasing resources. Instead of dampening the ’flames of ethnic
conflict’ (Brancati 2006), decentralization might in fact strengthen the
motives for and the resources necessary to launch or continue separatist
movements.
H3: Fiscal decentralization increases rebellion for local majorities
Groups which do not form a local majority are encouraged to claim
an equal treatment viz. the local majorities and ask for carving out new
regions in which they would be dominant (Cornell 2002). I stress here the
idea that administrative boundaries are to some extent endogenous to
the decentralization process. Green (2008b) and Diprose (2008) investi-
gated this under-researched dimension of decentralization in respectively
Uganda and Indonesia. Green shows that the tremendous multiplication
of districts creation which happened during the decentralization process
in Uganda had a lot do with patron-client relationship on one hand, and
claims from local minority ethnic groups to dispose of their own districts
on the other hand. In some instances these claims took a violent form.
H4: Decentralization increases rebellion for local minorities moti-
vated by the demand to create their own regions
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Before to turn to the quantitative analyses of these hypotheses, let
me illustrate first how the process of fiscal decentralization has indeed
provided various incentives for peace and violence to different kinds of
ethnic groups in post-independence India.
2.3 An Illustration of the Group’s Differentiated
Conflict Behaviour in Decentralization: The
Case of North-east India
The post-independence history of North-east India offers a striking illus-
tration of the conflicting above mentioned hypotheses1. Following the
partition of India, a federal and fiscally decentralized country, the Indian
North-east counted three states: Tripura, Manipur and Assam. Assam
exhibited a tremendous ethnic and religious diversity. In the periphery
of Assam lived some tribal groups (Mizos, Nagas, Khasi...) which in
our terminology are local minorities. This means that they were con-
centrated in Assam but none of these groups reached a majority of the
state population. In 1954, one of these groups, the Nagas, launched a
rebellion and claimed its own state. The protracted violence that ensued
was put to an end when the union government in New Delhi created the
Nagaland state in 1963. The example of the Nagas were followed by the
Mizos which started an armed rebellion in 1966. The union government
chose in a first stage to repress the movement before to change its strat-
egy. In 1972 New Delhi sought to settle all the North-eastern troubles
at once by creating Union Territories or states for the tribal groups liv-
ing in Assam. In particular the state of Mizoram was carved out from
the district of Lushai Mounts, where the Mizos were concentrated and
dominant. In consequence, in 1986 the Mizo National Front gave up
the armed rebellion. The reorganization of 1972 has not however suc-
ceeded in preventing ethnic violence altogether. In Assam communal
violence broke out between the minority of Bangladeshi Muslims and
the majority of Assamese Hindus. Since 1985 the United Liberation
1The account to follow draws on Jaffrelot (1997), chapter 12.
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Front of Assam (ULFA) - an Assamese armed group extremely hostile
to foreigners - began to increase the scale of its violent activities and
resorted to guerilla, murders and extortion. It took several direct in-
terventions of New Delhi, especially through the ’Presidential Rule’2,
to force its members to surrender. Furthermore the centrifugal move-
ments continued. For example the Bodos, another tribal group, which
have demanded an autonomous state since the 1970s engaged in mas-
sive violence from the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The Bodo Security
Force engaged notably in terrorism and kidnapping. In 1993 the vio-
lence receded as the Bodos accepted the idea of an autonomous Council
of Bodoland. It is worth noting that the Bodos were not a majority in
any district or town. They were concentrated in Assam but there its 1
million inhabitants were fairly geographically spread.
I argue that the experience of North-east India illustrates very well
the need to go beyond estimating an average group effect of fiscal de-
centralization and to ascertain whether local minorities and local ma-
jorities react in opposite ways to decentralization. The Mizos and the
Nagas were local minorities in the state of Assam. In the decentralized
India, they did not have a say in the conduct of the affairs of Assam
and this triggered violent movements to force the state to give them a
majority status. Once the majority status has been granted, the rebel-
lion has gradually receded. Interestingly, even the Bodos, which are not
a genuine territorial minority in Assam, have followed the same path.
In the meantime, some communal violence broke out. The specificity
of Assam lies in that the identities there are profoundly nested. This
implied that solving one problem (with the Nagas for instance) would
trigger a new series of violent claims from other groups as the adminis-
trative boundaries were modified and the majority and minority status
of all groups were also changed. It is not possible to know for sure what
would have been the history of the Indian North-east in the absence
2The ’Presidential Rule’ allows the centre to bypass the state governments and
rule them directly in case of persistent troubles that the state governments cannot
resolve.
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of decentralization. In contrast, we know that decentralization in India
gave rise to complicated dynamics of ethnic peace and violence, largely
due to the demographic characteristics of ethnic groups. These kinds of
dynamics has been overlooked thus far in the quantitative analyses of
decentralization. The rest of the paper tries to fill this gap.
3 Data and Methods
I will now turn to the empirical assessment of the effect of fiscal decen-
tralization on ethnic violence. Fiscal decentralization is captured by the
share of subnational expenditures in overall state spending. The data
originally come from the Government Financial Statistics computed by
the International Monetary Fund and have been gathered by the World
Bank along with other indicators of fiscal decentralization. I stress the
expenditure decentralization, as opposed to revenue decentralization,
since the discussion in the previous section made clear that what mat-
ters from the viewpoint of ethnic conflict is the groups’s capacity to
influence public spending at various levels of government. The decen-
tralization data covers between 34 and 55 countries on a yearly basis
between 1972 and 2001. This is a limited coverage as most of African
countries are left out of the dataset. There exists another dataset, com-
piled by Daniel Treisman, which provide indicators of decentralization
for a larger number of countries. But, unlike the IMF data, they are only
available for one period (the mid-1990s), rendering impossible the use
of panel data techniques. As I claim later in this section that the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity is of a crucial importance in this analysis, I
therefore choose to work with the IMF data in order to be able to control
for a potential omitted variables bias. The unit of analysis is the ethnic
groups at risk as defined by the Minorities At Risk (MAR) database.
MAR covers 285 groups around the world. The groups selected are
groups with a history and/or an ongoing experience of violence and/or
discrimination. All of these groups are demographic minorities. Along
with information on various forms of ethnic conflict and violence, the
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database makes available information on their demographic, political,
social and cultural characteristics. This is what I need to test the effect
of fiscal decentralization conditional on demographic groups’s charac-
teristics. In particular I use the binary variable ’regional base’ which
takes the value 1 if the group disposes of a ’spatially contiguous region
larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or
more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the
predominant proportion of the population’ (MAR Codebook, p. 18).
This variable captures well the notion of ’territorial minority’ as a group
having a regional base enjoys a territory it can claim. This means it can
rule this territory under decentralization, or call for independence on the
basis of this territory. Hence groups having a regional base do rebel sig-
nificantly more than groups lacking one. Yet, this variable is imperfect
as it does not distinguish between local majorities and local minorities.
In the data it turns out that slightly more than 20% of the territorial
minorities are not a simple majority of the regional population. I have
stressed in the previous section the need to distinguish between the in-
centives provided by fiscal decentralization in terms of conflict behaviour
on local majorities and local minorities. Therefore I have constructed a
new variable labelled ’local majority’ which takes the value 1 if the group
is majoritarian in its regional base and 0 otherwise3 Ethnic violence is
measured by the intensity and the presence of rebellion and communal
violence. It is important to distinguish between intensity and likelihood
of conflict as it may be that fiscal decentralization is ’peace-preventing’,
namely that it has an influence on the likelihood of conflict but not on
the intensity of ongoing conflicts, or ’conflict-mitigating’, namely that
it reduces the intensity of ongoing conflicts but fails to prevent the for-
mation of new conflicts. Rebellion refers to the violent actions engaged
by a group against the state as terrorism, guerilla or civil war. Com-
munal violence differs from rebellion as it measures violence occurring
between groups. It entails acts of anti-group demonstration, harass-
3I make use of the variable ’gc6b’ which informs on the regional proportion of the
population which belong to the groups.
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ment and communal warfare. The intensity of conflict is assessed by
MAR through an ordinal scale going from 0 to 7 for rebellion and 0 to
6 for communal violence. The variables of presence of conflict are dum-
mies which take the value 1 when the intensity of conflict is positive and
0 otherwise. Annual data are available from 1985 for rebellion and from
1990 for communal violence.
The models to estimate are as follows.
yit = β0 + β1Fisc.Decentralization+ β2Fisc.Decentralization ∗Rbase
+β3Xit + β4Zijt + cj + ζt + uijt (1)
yit = β0 + β1Fisc.Decentralization+ β2Fisc.Decentralization ∗ LocalMajority
+β3Xit + β4Zijt + cj + ζt + uijt (2)
The subscript i denotes the group, j the country and t the year of
observation. yijt is an indicator of ethnic violence, Rbase the regional
base variable, Xjt a vector of country level controls and Zijt a vector of
group level controls including Rbase or Localmajority. Finally cj is a
country specific effect and ζt a time trend.
As the variable of interest is measured at the country level and the
dependent variables are measured at the group level, one has to choose
between including group or country specific effects (including both is
not possible as the two dimensions are nested). I have decided to in-
clude a country specific effect as it is unlikely that some unobservable
characteristic of an ethnic minority would influence alone the degree
of fiscal decentralization in a country. This is confirmed by Hausman
tests which show that for every specifications that will be considered
thereafter a group specific effect is never correlated with fiscal decen-
tralization. The estimator will therefore be either country fixed effect
or country random effect. For each specification the choice follows the
result of a Hausman test. Both fixed and random effects rest on the
assumption of homoscedastic errors which is not supported by the data.
Statistical tests reveal that errors are both serially correlated and that
the variance of the errors is not constant across time. The estimations
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therefore use a robust variance-covariance matrix.
The use of panel data estimators is an improvement with respect to
previous studies which by and large resorted to pooling estimators. Fis-
cal decentralization is only one aspect of the institutional arrangements
that prevail in a country, and which are correlated with one another.
It is difficult to control for all the facets of institutional arrangements
which can include the type of electoral system, the various aspects of
decentralization, the openness of the political regime and so forth. More-
over it is likely that fiscal decentralization is correlated with some other
geographic or historical characteristics of a country which are (especially
for the latter) difficult to measure. For all these reasons the possibility
to use panel data estimators is a substantial improvement.
I will also control for variables that are time-varying and likely to
be correlated with both fiscal decentralization and ethnic violence. The
controls are the logarithm of the GDP per capita, stemming from the
World Development Indicators (WDI), the logarithm of the population
(WDI), the bureaucratic quality (computed by the International Coun-
try Risk Guide, ICRG), the level of democracy (from Polity IV), the
ethnic fragmentation index (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat
& Wacziarg 2003), the past autonomy status of the group (MAR) and
the group coherence index (MAR).
4 Results
4.1 Fiscal Decentralization and Territorial Minori-
ties
The estimated impacts of fiscal decentralization on intensity and like-
lihood of ethnic conflicts are found in the first panel of table I. The
coefficient associated with fiscal decentralization is allowed to be differ-
ent for groups having a regional base on the one hand, and for those
which do not have a regional base on the other. The lower part of the
table presents the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization along with
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its standard error for each type of groups . For each measure of conflict
I run country random effects or country fixed effects depending on the
result of a prior Hausman test robust to heteroskedasticity. There are
several findings worth noting. Firstly, the interaction term between fis-
cal decentralization and regional base is usually negative (except for the
likelihood of communal violence in column 4) and nearly always the coef-
ficient is statistically significant (except in column 1). This confirms that
the conflict behaviour of ethnic groups in decentralization differs across
groups, with respect to their demographic characteristics. Secondly, for
groups lacking a regional base, the marginal effect of fiscal decentral-
ization is surprisingly always negative. It even reaches the usual level
of confidence for the likelihood of rebellion (column 2). Thirdly, the
marginal effect of fiscal decentralization is consistently negative for ter-
ritorial minorities. They are statistically significant for the presence of
rebellion and both intensity and presence of communal violence. These
results do not reveal a distinction as neat as expected between ethnic
groups having a regional base and the others. In fact, if the interaction
term between fiscal decentralization and regional base is negative and
significant, the signs of the marginal effects are the same across groups.
The only difference is that the marginal effects are more often statisti-
cally significant for groups having a regional base. Before to go further,
I check the robustness of the results by testing whether they are driven
by outliers. I re-run the regressions without observations on India. In-
dian observations account for nearly 20% of the estimation sample as
the country hosts many ethnic minorities, and as it is well covered by
the decentralization data. The results are found in the lower panel of
table I. Insofar as territorial minorities are concerned, the results are
completely similar to those displayed in the upper panel of I. However,
for groups without a regional base, the effect of fiscal decentralization is
now never statistically significant. This set of results tends then to con-
firm the hypotheses that fiscal decentralization is of no consequence for
groups lacking a regional base and is effective at reducing rebellion and
communal violence for groups having a regional base. In India though,
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this does not seem to be the case, as even groups without a regional base
lower their level of violence when fiscal decentralization goes up. This
is an interesting result of its own, but to explain it is beyond the scope
of the paper.
4.2 Fiscal Decentralization and Local Majorities
The main assumption made in the paper is that within the category of
regionally concentrated groups, fiscal decentralization provides different
incentives to ethnic groups with respect to their local majority status. I
will now consider the interaction between fiscal decentralization and the
local majority variable. The introduction of the local majority variable
leads to a drastic reduction in the number of observations. This is due
to data limitations on the regional population of groups. After includ-
ing the same set of controls as in the previous estimations, the sample
is composed of only 12 local minorities in 9 countries and 42 local ma-
jorities in 29 countries. The results are displayed in the upper panel of
table II. They show that the divide between local minority and local
majority is relevant for rebellion. For local majorities, the effect of fiscal
decentralization is negative albeit statistically significant only for the
likelihood of rebellion. In contrast, the effect of fiscal decentralization is
positive for local minorities, and it reaches usual levels of confidence for
both intensity and likelihood of rebellion. Contrariwise, for communal
violence the results do not support the presence of this divide. The im-
pact of fiscal decentralization is negative for both local minorities and
local majorities and is always statistically significant. The magnitude
of the effect is even larger for local minorities than for local majori-
ties. The fear that decentralization would trigger inter-groups violence -
partly due to the weakness of local checks and balances - does not seem
grounded. The lower panel of table II replicates the analysis without the
Indian observations. The picture is similar to the one above, namely,
that for local majorities fiscal decentralization significantly reduces the
likelihood of rebellion and the intensity and likelihood of communal vi-
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olence. For local minorities, fiscal decentralization fuels rebellion and
detracts from communal violence. The positive point estimate of fiscal
decentralization in the rebellion regression is even much larger than in
the upper panel of table II. It turns out then that excluding Indian
observations strengthens the results.
These findings must be taken with caution given the low number
of local minorities included in the sample. In order to broaden the
estimation sample and to get reassurance about the robustness of the
results, I present in tables III and IV estimations with a fewer number
of controls. Only rebellion is considered as only for rebellion the divide
between local majorities and local minorities is relevant in the data.
Table III displays results for the intensity of rebellion whereas table
IV is concerned with the likelihood of rebellion. In column 1, I replace
bureaucratic quality by law and order (also stemming from ICRG) which
permits to enlarge the sample to 17 local minorities (in 10 countries) and
43 local majorities (in 29 countries). In both tables the point estimate of
fiscal decentralization for local minorities is nearly unchanged and is still
significant at the 5% level. This holds true when I use the sample without
India. In column 2, I remove the institutional variable, increasing the
number of local minorities to 19. The coefficient associated with fiscal
decentralization is similar and is still significant. Finally in column 3,
I drop the two variables of group cohesion and past autonomy status.
The sample includes now 20 local minorities in 13 countries and 48 local
majorities in 34 countries. Here again the results on local minorities are
unaffected. In consequence, the finding that fiscal decentralization fuels
rebellion for local minorities does not seem to be driven by the small
size of the sample.
4.3 Large local majorities versus small local ma-
jorities
The previous set of results has shown that fiscal decentralization pro-
duces different incentives to ethnic groups even within the category of
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territorial minorities. I investigate now whether the subcategory of local
majorities is in itself an heterogeneous category. To check this possibil-
ity, I split the local majorities further into 2 categories: local majorities
for which the group’s proportion of the regional population is below 75%
and local majorities for which the group’s proportion of the regional pop-
ulation is above 75%. I call the first category ’small local majority’ and
the second one ’large local majority’. These categories are created with
the MAR variable called ’gc6b’. The results shown in the upper panel
of table V are based on respectively 12 local minorities, 14 small local
majorities and 24 large local majorities. It turns out that as far as re-
bellion is concerned, the small local majorities behave similarly as the
local minorities. For both, fiscal decentralization fosters rebellion. Even
the magnitude of the coefficient is similar. In contrast, the reaction of
the large local majorities is drastically different from that of the two
other categories. They significantly reduce their level of rebellion with
fiscal decentralization. However the magnitude (in absolute value) of the
effect is roughly only half of that for the other groups. Regarding the
likelihood of rebellion, the results in column 2 show that fiscal decen-
tralization increases the risk of rebellion for local minorities and lowers
it for the large local majorities. Small local majorities are not affected
by fiscal decentralization. As in table II, fiscal decentralization does not
provide different group incentives for communal violence. The marginal
effect is negative for all 3 types of groups, but statistically significant
only for the local minorities and the large local majorities. The results
are unaffected when I increase the sample size by dropping some of the
controls.
The lower panel of table V presents the same estimations conducted
on a sample excluding India. While the signs of the different effects are
strictly similar to those obtained on the full sample, there is some notice-
able changes in the magnitudes of those effects. In fact, it appears that
the rebellion-producing effect of fiscal decentralization on local minori-
ties and small local majorities alike is dramatically enhanced. Roughly,
the size of this effect is doubled whereas the size of the rebellion-mitigating
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effect of fiscal decentralization on large local majorities stays unaffected.
Together these results mean that the desirable effect of fiscal decen-
tralization is concentrated on one category of ethnic group (the large
local majorities) while the undesirable effect of fiscal decentralization
hits both the local minorities and the small local majorities. In addi-
tion, the undesirable effect is twice as large as the desirable effect. It
is only because the large local majorities are more common than the
local minorities and the small local majorities that the average effect
of fiscal decentralization on the sample of territorial minorities at large
appears as desirable (see table I). Before to discuss the implications of
this result, I must try to explain it.
The fact that only large local majorities reduce their level of rebel-
lion with fiscal decentralization does not fit with the mechanism of the
median voter. However, as stated by the hypothesis H1b, it may be that
in imperfect democracies, to be a local majority does not suffice for the
group to control its own affairs. In many contexts, the central state
and some local ethnic minorities are engaged in a long-standing patron-
age relationship that exclude the principal local minority of the regional
power. In Uganda, Nigeria and Indonesia, the process of decentraliza-
tion has been accompanied by the creation of new local administrative
units (Green 2008a, Ukiwo 2006, Diprose 2008). Local ethnic groups
have fought for the control of these units and, in the absence of a strong
democratic environment, it is not certain that the biggest groups always
win. Yet, in the presence of large local majorities, the probability that
the control of the regional policy falls into the grip of a small group be-
comes unrealistic. It would take a pure autocratic regime to repress the
voice of a group accounting for more than three quarters of the regional
population.
5 Concluding Remarks
The bottom line of the paper is that the effect of fiscal decentralization
on rebellion is heterogeneous even within the rather narrow category of
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territorial minorities. Yet it is usually considered that territorial mi-
norities at large are responsive to fiscal decentralization as opposed to
dispersed groups. Proponents of and opponents to decentralization dis-
agree on the nature of this response but they agree on the focus on ter-
ritorial minorities. This paper suggests that this is greatly misleading.
Drawing on the most commonly arguments put forward by proponents
and opponents to fiscal decentralization, I have argued that one needs
to distinguish between local minorities and local majorities. Both are
territorial minorities but the incentives generated by fiscal decentral-
ization are likely to diverge between these two groups. The empirical
results confirm this hypothesis: fiscal decentralization quells rebellion
of local majorities and fuels rebellion of local minorities. Furthermore
the effect of fiscal decentralization on local minorities is stronger than
that on local majorities. However, as local majorities largely outnumber
local minorities, the effect of fiscal decentralization on territorial mi-
norities at large appears as desirable. On the ground that democracy
is not firmly established within the sample, I have checked whether the
cut-off between local minorities and local majorities was in fact shifted
upward, namely that a small local majority would be closer to a local
minority than to a large local majority. This proved consistent with the
data as fiscal decentralization dampens rebellion only for the large local
majorities. In contrast, fiscal decentralization fosters rebellion of both
local minorities and small local majorities.
The results have a strong interest in terms of policy recommenda-
tions. They show that if an ethnically fragmented country would engage
itself in a fiscal decentralization process (to improve the quality of the
governance for instance) it would generate sizeable and complex conse-
quences on the level and likelihood of ethnic rebellions. At first glance
the magnitudes of the marginal effects displayed in tables I - V seem
low. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in the level of fiscal
decentralization would result in a 80% increase of the intensity of re-
bellion of the average local minority, a 69% increase of the intensity of
rebellion of the average small local majority and a 32% decrease of the
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intensity of rebellion of the average large local majority. These are very
important effects, and as they point in opposite directions with respect
to ethnic groups characteristics, they suggest to be extremely careful
before to call for decentralization as a way to mitigate ethnic conflict.
More specifically, these results should push some countries to give up
on the use of fiscal decentralization even though previous results in the
literature would suggest otherwise. Hence for Mexico, where both the
Mayans and the Zapotecs are small local majorities, fiscal decentraliza-
tion should be avoided. The same is true for, among others, Nicaragua
(with Indigenous people), Colombia (Black people), Bulgaria and Roma-
nia (with respectively the Turks and the Magyars) and Sri Lanka (with
the Tamils). In contrast, Canada (with the Quebecois), Panama (with
the Indigenous people), Peru (with Indigenous people and Lowland in-
digenous people), Bolivia (with Indigenous highland people), the UK
(with the Scots), the Slovak Republic (with the Hungarians), Zimbabwe
(with the Ndebele) and South Africa (with the Zulus and the Xhosas)
are examples of countries where fiscal decentralization looks like a good
solution. Finally there exists a sizeable number of countries where both
local minorities and/or small local majorities coexist with large local
majorities. In those countries, the consequences of fiscal decentraliza-
tion are ambiguous. This concerns for instance Spain (with the Basques
and the Catalans), Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran and India.
These results strongly call for including the predicted effects of fis-
cal decentralization on ethnic conflict before donors and policy-makers
commit themselves to fiscal decentralization (e.g. as part of a ’good gov-
ernance’ reform package) in any country. The results shed also another
light on the previous empirical results of the literature. Studies which
have pooled every groups together or used country level violence mea-
sures have estimated an average treatment effects across ethnic groups.
The results of this paper directly challenge the relevance of such an
average effect.
In contrast such a story is not true when one looks at communal
violence. In that case fiscal decentralization reduces communal violence
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for every territorial minorities. This is a very encouraging result for
countries plagued by endemic inter-groups violence. Yet, as it is not
possible to separate the respective effects of fiscal decentralization on
rebellion and communal violence, even the use of fiscal decentralization
as a tool for mitigating communal violence may prove dangerous.
Finally, the findings show that both proponents and opponents hold
a part of the truth. Indeed, as advocated by the proponents of fiscal
decentralization, it seems true that devolving power-making to concen-
trated local majorities limits their motives to rebellion. In contrast, the
fear expressed by sceptics that decentralization reinforces secessionism
is not supported by the data. In the same time, however, the results
are consistent with the idea that decentralization fosters centrifugal de-
mands. Local minorities are encouraged to claim the creation of new
administrative regions in which they would be dominant. Such claims
takes more often than not a violent form.
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Dependent variable Intensity of Likelihood of Intensity of Likelihood of
rebellion rebellion communal communal
violence violence
Sample Full sample
Estimator Fixed effects Random effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



































Observations 970 970 605 605
Sample Without India
Estimator Fixed effects Random effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



































Observations 835 835 515 515
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The choice between fixed and random
effects follow a Hausman test robust to heteroskedacity. The estimations entail the
other following controls: logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of population,
democracy, bureaucratic quality, number of effective ethnic groups, group cohesion
index, autonomy claims, time trend.
Table I: Fiscal decentralization, ethnic conflict and territorial minorities
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Dependent variable Intensity of Likelihood of Intensity of Likelihood of
rebellion rebellion communal communal
violence violence
Sample Full sample
Estimator Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



































Observations 562 562 358 358
Sample Without India
Estimator Fixed effects Random effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



































Observations 457 457 288 288
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The choice between fixed and random
effects follow a Hausman test robust to heteroskedacity. The estimations entail the
other following controls: logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of population,
democracy, bureaucratic quality, number of effective ethnic groups, group cohesion
index, autonomy claims, time trend.
Table II: Fiscal decentralization, ethnic conflict and local majorities
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Dependent variable Intensity of Intensity of Intensity of Intensity of Intensity of Intensity of
rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion
Sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Without India Without India Without India
Estimator Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Robustness check Law and Order Without Without group Law and Order Without Without group



















































Observations 601 655 675 496 550 570
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The choice between fixed and random effects follow a Hausman test robust to heteroskedacity.
The estimations entail the other following controls: logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of population, democracy, bureaucratic
quality, number of effective ethnic groups, group cohesion index, autonomy claims, time trend. In columns (1) and (4) bureaucratic
quality is replaced by law and order, in columns (2) and (5) law and order is dropped and in columns (3) and (6) autonomy claims and
group cohesion index are dropped.
Table III: Fiscal decentralization, intensity of rebellion and local majorities: robustness checks
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Dependent variable Likelihood of Likelihood of Likelihood of Likelihood of Likelihood of Likelihood of
rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion rebellion
Sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Without India Without India Without India
Estimator Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Robustness check Law and Order Without Without group Law and Order Without Without group



















































Observations 601 655 675 496 550 570
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The choice between fixed and random effects follow a Hausman test robust to heteroskedacity.
The estimations entail the other following controls: logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of population, democracy, bureaucratic
quality, number of effective ethnic groups, group cohesion index, autonomy claims, time trend. In columns (1) and (4) bureaucratic
quality is replaced by law and order, in columns (2) and (5) law and order is dropped and in columns (3) and (6) autonomy claims and
group cohesion index are dropped.
Table IV: Fiscal decentralization, likelihood of rebellion and local majorities: robustness checks
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Dependent variable Intensity of Likelihood of Intensity of Likelihood of
rebellion rebellion communal communal
violence violence
Sample Full sample
Estimator Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



















































Observations 562 562 358 358
Sample Without India
Estimator Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed Effects Fixed effects



















































Observations 457 457 288 288
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The choice between fixed and random
effects follow a Hausman test robust to heteroskedacity. The estimations entail the
other following controls: logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of population,
democracy, bureaucratic quality, number of effective ethnic groups, group cohesion
index, autonomy claims, time trend.
Table V: Fiscal decentralization, ethnic conflict and small versus large
minorities
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